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Abstract
In this paper, we study eﬃcient dissolution of partnerships in a context of incomplete
information. We generalize the results of Cramton, Gibbons and Klemperer (1987) to situ-
ations where the partnership takes on a common value that may depend upon all partners’
types, so that each partner’s individual rationality constraint depends on types other than
his own. We show that in this case not only the distribution of ownership, emphasized in
the earlier literature, but also the distribution of control within an organization matter to
determine the possibility of eﬃcient dissolution. We underscore this point by showing that
two-person partnerships where one partner exercises complete control cannot be dissolved
eﬃciently with any incentive compatible, individually rational mechanism, regardless of the
ownership structure.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In 1999, Dave Aynes, 50% owner of Blue Sky Coﬀee in Athens, GA, wished to buy out his partner
Mark Fierer. According to their partnership agreement, dissolution was to occur by "Cowboy
Shootout," where either partner can make an oﬀer at any time but where any partner’s oﬀer for
the other’s shares is both a bid and ask. The responding partner can buy or sell at that price,
but must choose one of these options. Expecting to buy, Dave shaded his bid for Mark’s shares
a bit below his own valuation for the business. Things degenerated quickly.
Mark was living in Los Angeles, CA, more than 3,000 miles away, at the time. Since Blue
Sky was proﬁtable, Mark’s nominal role as a 50% partner ensured him a steady ﬂow of income.
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1Mark viewed Dave’s oﬀer as too low, and thus decided to buy out Dave at his oﬀer price. Upon
learning of the prospect of this potential buyout, some of Blue Sky’s vendors indicated that they
would be unwilling to maintain the same relationship with Blue Sky.1 This problem had not
been foreseen in the partners’ contractually speciﬁed dissolution mechanism. Ultimately, since
it was in fact eﬃcient for Dave, who lived in Athens and had emerged over time as a superior
manager, to own Blue Sky, Dave renegotiated to buy out Mark, though at a higher price than
his original oﬀer. In the process, substantial wasted eﬀort had been undertaken and feelings had
been hurt.
At ﬁrst glance, this case seems to illustrate the shortcomings of the Cowboy Shootout as a
dissolution mechanism.2 Since Mark’s value for the ﬁrm was above Dave’s bid (but almost surely
beneath Dave’s valuation), his attempt to buy out Dave reﬂects the inherent ineﬃciency of this
dissolution mechanism. However, as we argue in this paper, it is unlikely that any individually
rational dissolution mechanism would have worked eﬃciently in view of the way their partnership
was functioning. Speciﬁcally, provided that their valuations for Blue Sky under the partnership
were interdependent–as it would be the case if they valued the ﬁrm according to its ﬂows
of proﬁts–and since Dave was exercising virtually complete control over the management of
the ﬁrm, it would be impossible to design an individually rational mechanism that ensured an
eﬃcient dissolution of the partnership.
Theoretical inquiries into the eﬃcient dissolution of partnerships have shown that asymmetric
information and asymmetric ownership shares both make it diﬃcult and sometimes impossible
to design individually rational mechanisms to implement eﬃcient dissolution. Akerlof (1970)
provided the fundamental intuition for the eﬀects of asymmetric information in an extreme-
ownership setting, and Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) proved general impossibility results
for bilateral exchange under private information. Subsequent work, particularly that of Cram-
ton, Gibbons and Klemperer (1987, henceforth "CGK"), has shown that, among partners with
independent and identically distributed signals, the Myerson-Satterthwaite impossibility result
extends to partnerships where the partners’ shares are unbalanced though not necessarily ex-
treme. CGK point out, however, that equal-shares partnerships can always be dissolved eﬃ-
ciently while unequal-shares partnerships can be dissolved eﬃciently provided that ownership is
not "too unbalanced."
In recent work, Jehiel and Pauzner (2002), Moldovanu (2002) and Fieseler, Kittsteiner and
Moldovanu (2003) consider instead the case of interdependent private valuations. They all show
that interdependent private valuations can aﬀect the set of dissolvable partnerships signiﬁcantly.
Fieseler et al. and Moldovanu ﬁnd that, when information is ex-ante symmetric, a partnership
1For instance, Blue Sky’s landlord refused to negotiate a new lease in Mark’s name.
2Moldovanu (2002) refers to this type of mechanism as the "Texas Shootout;" McAfee (1992) proves that it is
generally ineﬃcient.
2is more diﬃcult to dissolve if a given partner’s valuation is increasing in the types of the other
partners, while the opposite is true if the partner’s valuation is decreasing in the signals of the
other partners. In the former case, the equal-shares partnership may not be dissolvable eﬃciently,
while in the latter case eﬃcient bilateral exchange may be possible. Jehiel and Pauzner focus
on cases where only one partner is informed about the value of the co-owned asset. In such a
setting, they identify a wide class of situations where eﬃcient dissolution is unachievable.
In the models of all papers cited above, individual rationality requires that any partner aware
of his private signal earns, via the dissolution mechanism, at least as much as his share times
his implied expected valuation. This modeling choice neglects one potentially crucial feature of
partnerships–that an entity’s gross value, from an individual partner’s perspective, may depend
on the very existence of the partnership. That is, for any partner, the entity/asset may take on
diﬀerent gross values depending on whether it remains a partnership or it is dissolved.
Circumstances where this occurs are natural in many trading situations. Consider, for in-
stance, the case of a regular business whose value stems from the ﬂow of proﬁts it generates. In
such a case, the independent valuation of each partner would reﬂect the proﬁts he could make
with full ownership–and thus complete control–of the business’s assets.3 Under a partnership,
by contrast, control is generally distributed among the partners, giving rise to a diﬀerent admin-
istration and thus a distinct ﬂow of proﬁts. Such proﬁts represent the value of the assets under
the partnership and are common to all partners. Individual rationality then requires that any
partner aware of his private signal earns, via the dissolution mechanism, at least as much as his
share times his expected valuation for the business were it to remain a partnership.T h i sv i e w
contrasts with the conventional notion in the literature, where valuations do not depend on the
distribution of control.4
Considering that partners are restricted to using individually rational, incentive compatible
mechanisms, in the tradition of the literature, we provide general conditions governing when
eﬃcient dissolution of partnerships that share the features described above are possible. Specif-
ically, each partner has an independent type that represents his private valuation for the asset
if it is owned individually. Each partner draws his type from distributions that share a common
support, but we allow them to be otherwise diﬀerent. Under the partnership, the asset provides
a common value for all partners, which may depend on their independent private valuations.
3Control represents in this paper what Aghion and Tirole (1997) have described as real authority.W ee m p l o y
a distinct terminology to distinguish our paper from the literature spurred by Aghion and Tirole’s seminal paper,
since we focus on distinct issues from those emphasized in that line of research–e.g., we do not attempt to explain
how real authority is acquired or when it is likely to be detached from formal authority.
4A related but distinct approach is taken by Jehiel and Pauzner (2002), who allow for "increasing returns to
scale" in the ownership shares. That is, they allow each partner’s valuation for the asset to increase dispropor-
tionately with the partner’s share of the asset. In such a case, valuations depend on the ownership structure. We
posit that valuations may depend also on the ﬁrm’s structure of control, which may or may not be related with
the ownership structure.
3Thus, our structure can be viewed as a hybrid of the independent private values case stud-
ied by CGK and the interdependent valuations case examined by Jehiel and Pauzner (2002),
Moldovanu (2002) and Fieseler et al. (2003). The distinctive feature of our setting is that here
"sole proprietor" valuations are independent, while valuations under co-ownership are common.
In general, the common value of a partnership depends on how its assets are managed.
Since several forms of management are possible, co-owners must decide which to employ. Such
a decision may depend on a myriad of features related to the partnership–background and
experience of the partners, the distribution of shares among them, as well as the issues shaping
real authority mentioned by Aghion and Tirole (1997). Explaining this choice is, however,
b e y o n dt h es c o p eo ft h i sp a p e r ,w h e r ew et a k et he distribution of control, and the resulting
interdependent individual valuations for the partnership, as given.
While we provide general conditions for dissolvability of partnerships that share the char-
acteristics just described, we highlight our main point by focusing the balance of our analysis
on a particular form of arrangement, which is similar to that of Blue Sky. Speciﬁcally, one
partner runs the business independently, while the other partners share the proﬁts but do not
have any inﬂuence on its management. We term this type of control structure (in the absence of
a better name) a "silent partnership," where one partner is "active" and all others are "silent"
(in the case of Blue Sky, Dave served as the "active" partner and Mark as the single "silent"
partner). In such a case, the gross value of the entity as a partnership, common to all partners,
is simply the active partner’s valuation, since his valuation corresponds to what he would obtain
by owning, and thus controlling, the entity solely.
We show that there is not any incentive compatible, individually rational mechanism that
can dissolve eﬃciently silent partnerships that consist of only two partners. While surprising in
view of previous results in the literature, this ﬁnding highlights how the distribution of control
in organizations can aﬀect the prospects of dissolution. The asymmetry of control, emphasized
at the extreme in a silent partnership, thus emerges as another potential stumbling block for
eﬃcient dissolution of partnerships.
We also ﬁnd, however, that as the number of partners increases, the problems stemming
from asymmetry of control may be mitigated, making eﬃcient dissolution "easier" (in a sense
to be made clear in Section 3) to achieve. In fact, with more than two partners even extreme
ownership partnerships can be dissolvable, as long as the eﬀective owner of the business–the
one who owns all of its assets–is a silent partner; if the eﬀective owner is instead the active
partner, the Myerson-Satterthwaite impossibility result obtains.
We also analyze how the relative "abilities" of partners aﬀect dissolvability. We show that,
provided that the ownership share of the active partner is not too large, having a "better" active
partner makes dissolution more diﬃcult, while having "better" silent partners makes dissolution
easier. We conclude with an example that illustrates each of our key results.
4The balance of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we derive conditions gov-
erning eﬃcient dissolution of partnerships when valuations are common under co-ownership
but independent otherwise. In Section 3, we apply our results to study the structure of silent
partnerships. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
The conventional notion of individual rationality is that any partner aware of his valuation of
the entity earns, via the dissolution mechanism, at least as much as his share (say ri)t i m e sh i s
valuation (say vi), namely Ui(vi) ≥ rivi. This notion of individual rationality is appropriate in
some situations but not in others,5 as for example when the partnership is a business whose
value derives from the ﬂow of proﬁts it generates for the partners. In situations like that, the
value of the assets for all partners under the partnership are likely to be interdependent–and
possibly common. At a general level, we can deﬁne this value as a common function of all
partners’ individual valuations, namely vP = vP(v1,...,v n). Thus, to participate in a dissolution
mechanism, each partner will require at least his share ri of the ﬁrm’s value vP–which in general
is diﬀerent from vi. That is, the individual rationality constraint that needs to be satisﬁed for
each partner is not Ui(vi) ≥ rivi, but Ui(vi) ≥ rivP.
The actual form of vP will ultimately depend on how the organization is managed by the
partners and how they interact in exercising control. We could have, in particular, either
vP > max{vi,...,v n} or vP ≤ max{vi,...,v n}. The former case corresponds to situations where
interaction among the partners creates a positive externality (i.e., there is "synergy"), while the
latter case may represent situations where the partners do not work well together, or where a
partner who is not the most capable "manager" among them detains full control. We develop
our general results for eﬃcient dissolution of partnerships without restricting the form of vP.W e
nevertheless note that it will be eﬃcient to dissolve a partnership only when vP ≤ max{vi,...,v n},
so the following analysis is relevant only to those circumstances. When that condition is met, a
dissolution mechanism will be eﬃcient if it allocates the entity to the partner with the highest
valuation with probability one.
5For instance, suppose two individuals share the purchase price of a recreational motorboat as well as the
fees required to dock it in a marina that they both use. They furthermore divide the rights to use the boat
according to their shares. If they later decide to dissolve the partnership by having one partner sell out, the
conventional notion of individual rationality is sensible. In maintaining the partnership as it is, each partner
derives a particular enjoyment vi from the boat, and receives that enjoyment at any given moment with probability
ri. Therefore, for each partner’s participation in the dissolution mechanism to be individually rational, inequality
Ui(vi) ≥ rivi must hold.
52.1 Preliminaries
A ﬁrm is jointly owned by n risk-neutral partners indexed by i ∈ {1,...,n}. Partner i owns a
share ri ∈ [0,1] of the partnership; shares sum to 1 (
Pn
i=1 ri =1 ) . Partner i has type vi,w h e r e
vi ∈ [v,v]. Each vi is drawn independently from distribution Fi, which is common knowledge
and has positive continuous density fi.E a c ht y p evi represents the ﬁrm’s ﬂow of proﬁts under
partner i’s sole administration. Intuitively, it can be understood as a measure of partner i’s
"managerial capacity."
Under the partnership, the ﬁrm generates aggregate proﬁts that deﬁne a common gross
v a l u ef o rt h ep a r t n e r s ,vP = vP(v1,...,v n). This value will depend on the (exogenously given)
distribution of control and on the (quality of the) interaction among the partners eﬀectively
controlling the ﬁrm. Proﬁts are distributed to the partners according to their shares in the ﬁrm.
For example, partner i receives vPri.
Using the revelation principle, we focus on a direct revelation game where partners re-
port simultaneously their valuations v = {v1,...,v n} and a mechanism allocates shares s(v)=
{s1,...,s n} and determines transfer payments t(v)={t1,...,t n} to the players. We restrict atten-





We refer to hs,ti as a trading mechanism.
Under the mechanism, partner i obtains utility visi+ti. Let −i ≡ N\i and let E−i{·} denote
the expectation operator with respect to v−i. A generic partner i expects to receive shares
and transfers Si(vi) ≡ E−i{si(vi)} and Ti(vi) ≡ E−i{ti(vi)}, respectively. His expected utility
from the mechanism is therefore given by Ui(vi)=viSi(vi)+Ti(vi). By contrast, partner i’s
expected utility under the partnership is riPi(v),w h e r ePi(v) ≡ E−i{vP(v)}. In the remainder
of this section, we provide the conditions for eﬃcient dissolution of such partnerships. Since our
distinct set of individual rationality constraints does not require altering the CGK methodology
signiﬁcantly, we follow it closely.
2.2 Conditions for Eﬃcient Dissolution of a Partnership
We restrict attention to incentive compatible mechanisms. Incentive compatibility requires
Ui(vi) ≥ viSi(u)+Ti(u) for all i,vi,u∈ [v,v]. (1)
In turn, a trading mechanism hs,ti is individually rational if each of the partners expects to
receive a non-negative net payoﬀ from participating in the mechanism:
Ui(vi) ≥ riPi(v) for all i,vi ∈ [v,v]. (2)
This is the condition that distinguishes this paper from previous studies. Essentially, partners’
6valuations are interdependent if the partnership is kept but independent if the partnership is
dissolved. This perspective contrasts with the viewpoint of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983)
and CGK, who consider valuations to be always independent, as well as with that of Fieseler
et al. (2003), Jehiel and Pauzner (2002) and Moldovanu (2002), who consider valuations to be
always interdependent.
In such a setting, the following lemmas specify necessary and suﬃcient conditions for a
mechanism to be incentive compatible and individually rational. First, since the conditions
required for incentive compatibility do not depend upon the individual rationality constraint,
they are the same as in CGK.
Lemma 1 A trading mechanism hs,ti is incentive compatible if and only if, for every i ∈ N,
Si is increasing and
Ti(v∗







Proof. See CGK, pp. 626-27.
Henceforth, we require the following condition to be satisﬁed:
Condition 1 P0
i(v) ≡ dPi(v)/dvi ≥ 0 and P00
i (v) ≡ d2Pi(v)/dv2
i <S 0
i(vi) ∀ i.
Condition 1 asserts that the expected value of the partnership is weakly increasing in each
partner’s type. Intuitively, this simply indicates that proﬁts under the partnership tend to be
(weakly) higher when the owners are "more capable." The condition also asserts that Pi(.) must
be either concave or not "too convex" in each vi (since Lemma 1 requires S0
i ≥ 0), so the function
displays either decreasing or not-too-increasing marginal returns.6
Condition 1 is necessary for our characterization of the worst-oﬀ type of trader for each
partner. Characterizing the worst-oﬀ type is important because it deﬁnes a lower bound for the
individual rationality constraint: if it pays for the worst-oﬀ type to participate in the mechanism,
it pays for all other types as well.
Lemma 2 Given an incentive compatible mechanism hs,ti such that the expected share function
is monotone increasing and continuous on [v,v], trader i0s net utility achieves a minimum at
v∗
i ,w h e r ev∗




i ,v −i). (4)
6Note that, under CGK’s standard notion of individual rationality, Pi(v)=vi, so Condition 1 is trivially
satisﬁed.
7Proof. The minimization of Ui(vi) − riPi(v) is characterized by ﬁrst-order necessary condition
U0
i(vi)=riP0
i(v). But from Lemma 1, it follows that U0
i(vi)=Si(vi). Hence, the net expected
gain from the mechanism is minimized at v∗
i such that Si(v∗
i )=riP0
i(v∗
i ,v −i), since the second-
order condition for a minimum, S0
i(vi) >r iP00(v∗
i ), is satisﬁed by Condition 1 and because
S0
i(vi) ≥ 0 from Lemma 1.
In the present setting, the worst-oﬀ type may expect to be either a seller or a buyer under
the mechanism. Such an expectation depends on how P0
i(v∗
i ,v −i) compares with unity. If
P0
i(v∗
i ,v −i)=1 , as in CGK, the worst-type expects to be neither a seller nor a buyer. By
contrast, it expects to be a buyer (seller) whenever P0
i(v∗
i ,v −i) > 1( < 1).
We can now establish necessary and suﬃcient conditions for individual rationality.
Lemma 3 A ni n c e n t i v ec o m p a t i b l em e c h a n i s mhs,ti is individually rational if and only if, for
all i ∈ N,
Ti(v∗
i ) ≥ ri
£
Pi(v∗






Proof. We need only check individual rationality for the worst-oﬀ types {v∗
i }. The constraint




i ) ≥ riPi(v∗
i ,v −i).
Using Lemma 2, it is straightforward to see that this condition is equivalent to equation 5.
We are now ready to characterize the set of dissolvable partnerships.
Lemma 4 For any share function s such that Si is increasing for all i ∈ N, there exists a

























A mechanism hs,ti is ex-post eﬃcient if the partnership is sold to the partner with the
highest private valuation. Thus, we have the following modiﬁed version of CGK’s Theorem 1:
Theorem 1 A partnership with ownership rights {ri} and types {vi} independently drawn from
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vi∈[v,v]





Theorem 1 characterizes the set of dissolvable partnerships. Within our framework, the
results of CGK form an important special case in which the right-hand side of equation 7 is nil
and distributions Fi are identical for all i. We next introduce the notion of silent partnerships
and study the circumstances when their eﬃcient dissolution can be accomplished.
3 Asymmetric Control and The Silent Partnership
There are many possible situations in which one partner exercises disproportionate control of
the partnership’s operations. The simplest and perhaps most common occurs when, in order to
ﬁnance a venture, an entrepreneur sells equity in his venture to investors who have little interest
in managing the partnership.7 To analyze the impact of asymmetric control on dissolvability,
we focus on an important benchmark case, which we term the "silent partnership."
3.1 Deﬁnition and Basic Rationale
In a silent partnership, one "active" partner has full control over the business, managing it on
behalf of himself and the other "silent" partners. Each partner has an independent private signal
that represents what the value for the ﬁr mw o u l db ei fh ew e r et ob ei t ss o l ep r o p r i e t o r .B e c a u s e
of the silent partnership structure, however, the value of the ﬁrm as a partnership is given by
the active partner’s signal, since he alone controls the ﬁrm’s operation.
Deﬁnition 1 (Silent Partnership - SP hn,r,F1,F 2i) Let partner 1 have full control over the
jointly owned business; call him the "active" partner and all other n − 1 partners the "silent"
partners. Let r denote the active partner’s share of the partnership; thus, the silent partners’
shares sum to (1 − r). Let the active partner’s signal v1 be drawn from distribution F1 and
the silent partners signals {v2,...,v n} be each drawn from distribution F2.A l l vi are drawn
independently. Furthermore, distributions F1 and F2 have a mutual support [v,v]. The value of
the ﬁrm under the partnership is deﬁned as vP(v1,...,v n)=v1.
Under this structure, whenever the signal of any silent partner is higher than the active
partner’s signal, an eﬃcient dissolution of the partnership is Pareto improving. Generally, if
the active partner’s private valuation is high (low), he will wish to buy out (sell to) the silent
partners. A silent partner with a high valuation will also wish to buy out his partners. However,
if his valuation is low, he does not wish to sell; rather, he prefers to keep the partnership intact.
7This was, in fact, the original reason why Mark Fierer became a partner in Blue Sky.
9Thus, given the partners’ potential contrasting incentives to seek dissolution, it is important to
strive for eﬃcient mechanisms to accomplish this.
Note that, under our structure, the active partner’s signal may have a diﬀerent distribution
than the silent partners’ signals. As such, our main impossibility results are robust to situations
where the active partner is believed to be a "better" or "worse" manager than the silent part-
ners as well as to situations where the partners have had the opportunity to learn about the
active partner’s skills. Moreover, this allows us to analyze whether more capable partners make
dissolution easier.









i = v for all i 6=1 . Using this information, we can apply Theorem 1 to ﬁnd that a silent




















where G1(u)=F2(u)n−1 and G2(u)=F1(u)F2(u)n−2. The terms on the left-hand side of the
inequality give the sum of the expected transfers to the worst-oﬀ types of partners. Not including
possible side payments, the term in braces is the expected transfer (T∗
1) to the worst-oﬀ type
of active partner (G−1
1 (r)). Note that this type of active partner will be, on average, neither
a buyer nor a seller under the mechanism. This property holds for all worst-oﬀ types in the
setting analyzed by CGK. Intuitively, this type is the worst-oﬀ b e c a u s eh ew o u l dr e v e a lh i st y p e
truthfully without any incentives and thus receives no informational rent.
The worst-oﬀ type of silent partner (v), on the other hand, is independent of the distribution
of shares. As such, the sum of the expected transfers to the worst-oﬀ types of silent partners,
not including side payments, is just (n−1) times the expected transfer to any one of them. Note
that the worst-oﬀ type of any silent partner expects to sell his shares with certainty.
The term on the right-hand side of the inequality is the sum of the expected proﬁts that
would accrue to the silent partners were the partnership to remain intact. Note that only the
size, and not the distribution, of the (1 − r) share of the partnership among the silent partners
matters for dissolvability. Since the worst-oﬀ type of silent partner sells his shares with certainty,
this term equals exactly the minimum total compensation that the silent partners need to receive
under the mechanism to be willing to participate.
In proving our results, we make frequent use of the following Lemma, which presents a
simpliﬁed version of condition 8.








1 − r − (n − 1)F2(u)n−2 [1 − F2(u)]
ª
F1(u)du ≥ 0 (9)
Proof. See Appendix.
3.2 Impossibility Results
Under the partnership structure SP hn,r,F1,F 2i, the inherent asymmetry of control aﬀects
crucially the possibility of constructing eﬃcient dissolution mechanisms. In particular, when
there are only two partners, eﬃcient dissolution is impossible regardless of the distribution of
ownership shares. In addition, as in Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) and CGK, extreme
asymmetric ownership makes eﬃcient dissolvability/exchange more diﬃcult to achieve. In our
setting, when the active partner owns the entire ﬁrm (r =1 ) ,e ﬃciency cannot be achieved.
However, eﬃciency becomes possible when a silent partner owns the entire ﬁrm. We present
each set of results in turn.
Proposition 1 An SP hn =2 ,r,F 1,F 2i cannot be dissolved eﬃciently with an incentive com-
patible, individually rational mechanism.
Proof. We will show that inequality 9 does not hold in this case. Note that in a SP with n =2 ,




[r − F2(u)]du +
Z v
v
[F2(u) − r]F1(u)du ≥ 0.








[F2(u) − r]F1(u)du ≥ 0. (10)
It is easy to see that both terms in the left-hand side of this inequality are non-positive and at






[r − F2(u)][1 − F1(u)]du ≤ 0,






F1(u)[F2(u) − r]du ≤ 0,
11where the inequality is strict if r>0. Therefore, for r ∈ [0,1], neither term in the left-hand side
of inequality 10 is positive and at least one is strictly negative. It follows that Theorem 1 does
not hold for an SP hn =2 ,r,F 1,F 2i.
Intuitively, dissolution is impossible here precisely because the worst-oﬀ type of silent partner
expects to sell to the active partner with certainty. He will only wish to participate if he
expects to be paid a price (per share) that is at least as large as the active partner’s (expected)
valuation. But since it is impossible to get truthful revelation from the active partner without
giving him some informational rent, a positive outside subsidy is necessary to make participation
individually rational for all types.
Such a subsidy is also necessary to achieve eﬃcient "dissolution" when the active partner
owns the entire ﬁrm.
Proposition 2 An SP hn,r =1 ,F 1,F 2i cannot be dissolved eﬃciently with an incentive com-
patible, individually rational mechanism.




F1(u)F2(u)n−2 [1 − F2(u)]du ≥ 0, (11)
which is a contradiction, thus completing the proof.
Notice that expression 11 is, for n =2 , identical to Myerson and Satterthwaite’s (1983)
equation 7. In our setting, this also represents the minimum outside subsidy necessary to
facilitate eﬃcient dissolution. Indeed, dissolution is impossible in this particular case for precisely
the same reasons as in Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983). Intuitively, any incentive compatible
mechanism requires a transfer to be made regardless of whether the active partner sells the ﬁrm.
Thus, when the active partner is the worst-oﬀ type (v), he knows that, under the mechanism,
he must make a payment despite the fact that he will maintain full ownership with certainty.
The expected gains to the worst-oﬀ types of silent partners are not large enough to produce a
big enough side payment from the silent partners to the active partner to induce the worst-oﬀ
active partner to participate.
In contrast to Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) and CGK, however, when the partnership
is owned entirely by one silent partner (r =0 ) ,e ﬃcient "dissolution" may be possible. This is
seen as a simple consequence of our ﬁnding that, for r<1, dissolvability is always possible if n
is large enough.
Proposition 3 Any SP hn,r < 1,F 1,F 2i can be dissolved eﬃciently with an incentive compat-
ible, individually rational mechanism for suﬃciently large n.
12Proof. We will show that condition 9 can always be satisﬁed when n becomes arbitrar-






(r) becomes arbitrarily close to v,
G1(r) ≡ Fn−1
2 (u) becomes arbitrarily close to zero and the ﬁrst integral in 9 vanishes. Further-
more, since limn→∞(n−1)F2(u)n−2 [1 − F2(u)]F1(u)=0 , the second integral in 9 specializes to
R v





which is satisﬁed for any distribution F1(u).
If r =0 , the worst-oﬀ type (v) is the same for all partners, and each of these types expects to
sell their shares with certainty. When n>2, there are at least two silent partners. Thus, if there
is a full-ownership silent partner and he happens to be the worst-oﬀ type, he expects to sell to
the active partner with some probability and expects to sell to one of the other silent partners
with some probability. Thus, in any eﬃcient mechanism, he sells at a price that exceeds, in
expected terms, the active partner’s valuation. Hence, his expected payoﬀ may, after factoring
in informational rents, exceed his payoﬀ from his continued ownership. The worst-oﬀ type of
active partner, knowing that with certainty he will not buy the ﬁrm, needs no incentives to
participate in the mechanism.
It is worth noting that when n increases, the additional "partners" need not own positive
shares in the ﬁrm. In fact, they may simply represent additional bidders for the partnership.
Interestingly, then, for r<1 it may be possible to overcome the impossibility result for n =2if
the two owners are willing to permit outsiders to buy the ﬁrm.
Note, however, that while any SP with r<1 can be dissolved for large enough n, it is not
always the case that dissolvability becomes easier with a larger n. In particular, when r is near
1a n dn is small, it is straightforward to ﬁnd distributions of the partners’ signals such that
dissolvability becomes more diﬃcult with an additional partner. We explore this issue further
with an example in subsection 3.4.
3.3 Comparative Statics
When n>2 and r<1, whether a silent partnership is dissolvable depends upon the number
of partners n, the active partner’s share r and the distribution of the partners’ signals F1 and
F2. In this and the next subsection, we show how changes in each of these primitives aﬀect
dissolvability. When characterizing the set of dissolvable partnerships, we will refer frequently
to the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 2 Given two silent partnerships SP and SP∗, we say that SP∗ is "easier" to dissolve
13than SP if and only if the left-hand side of inequality 9 (in Lemma 5) is larger for SP∗.
Thus, if SP is dissolvable and SP∗ is easier to dissolve, then SP∗ must also be dissolvable.
By the same token, if SP∗ is easier to dissolve than SP but SP∗ is not dissolvable without a
positive outside subsidy, then SP requires a larger outside subsidy to be dissolvable.
Given this deﬁnition, in the setting of CGK the equal-shares partnership is the easiest to
dissolve. This is not typically true in a silent partnership, although it is still true that the
extreme-ownership settings (r =0and r =1 )are never the easiest to dissolve.
Proposition 4 Let µ1 ≡
R v
v udF1(u).I fp a r t n e r s h i pSP hn,r,F1,F 2i can be dissolved eﬃciently
for some r, then partnership SP hn,r = G1(µ1),F 1,F 2i can be dissolved eﬃciently too. Simi-
larly, if partnership SP hn,r = G1(µ1),F 1,F 2i cannot be dissolved eﬃciently, then partnership
SP hn,r,F1,F 2i cannot be dissolved eﬃciently for any r.
Proof. It is suﬃcient to show that the left-hand side of condition 9 is maximized when r =






















= v − G−1
1 (r) − (v − µ1)
= µ1 − G−1
1 (r).
Since this expression is decreasing in r (dG−1
1 (r)/dr > 0), the left-hand side of condition 9 is
maximized when µ1 = G−1
1 (r)–or equivalently, when r = G1(µ1), completing the proof.
Hence, for given n,F1 and F2, the partnership with r = G1(µ1) is the easiest to dissolve.
Ownership shares aﬀect dissolution in two diﬀerent ways in this setting. On the one hand, a
greater r decreases the expected transfer to the worst-oﬀ type of active partner at a rate G−1
1 (r),
just as it would do under CGK’s setting. The worst-oﬀ type of silent partners are, however,
qualitatively distinct. Their expected transfers do not increase with r [i.e. as their (1−r) share
decreases], as they would under CGK’s setting. Rather, their participation costs fall with r,a t
a constant rate µ1. Conditions for eﬃcient dissolution are facilitated at the extreme when these
two rates are equalized, as proved above.8
In a sense, this insight resembles a key result from CGK, namely that eﬃcient dissolution
tends to become easier to achieve as the ownership structure becomes less extreme. Indeed, it
is clear that, for any ﬁnite n and non-degenerate F2 distribution, 0 <G 1(µ1) < 1, so the most
8In CGK, the two correspondent rates (for the 2-player case) would be G
−1(r) and G
−1(1 − r)–recall that
they consider identical distributions. Thus, dissolution is facilitated at the extreme when G
−1(r)=G
−1(1 − r),
which occurs when r =
1
2.
14extreme-ownership settings are indeed never the easiest to dissolve. However, it is also clear that
the equal-shares partnership will not generally be the easiest to dissolve, as G1(µ1) depends on
F1, F2 and n.
Since the impossibility of dissolving two-person silent partnerships is due, essentially, to
possible free-riding by the silent partner, it is to be expected that, as the beneﬁts from free-riding
increases, dissolution would become more diﬃcult. Intuitively, free-riding by silent partners
becomes a more attractive option for them as the distribution of the active partner’s signal
becomes "better" or as the distribution of the silent partner’s signal becomes "worse." We now
analyze these eﬀects in turn.
First, we show that the presence of an active partner who is a "better" manager makes
dissolution more diﬃcult whenever r is not too large.
Proposition 5 Consider distributions F∗
1 and F1 such that F∗
1 ﬁrst-order stochastically dom-





.I f p a r t n e r s h i p SP hn>2,r≤ e r(n),F∗
1,F 2i can
be dissolved eﬃciently, then partnership SP hn>2,r≤ e r(n),F 1,F 2i can be dissolved eﬃciently
too. Similarly, if partnership SP hn>2,r≤ e r(n),F 1,F 2i cannot be dissolved eﬃciently, then
partnership SP hn>2,r≤ e r(n),F∗
1,F 2i cannot be dissolved eﬃciently either.
Proof. See Appendix.
When v1 is drawn from F∗
1 instead of F1,w h e r eF∗
1 ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates F1,
there is no change from the perspective of an active partner of a given type. By contrast, for the
silent partners, incentive compatibility becomes less costly while individual rationality becomes
more costly to achieve. The former eﬀect occurs because the informational rents required to
induce truth-telling by the silent partners fall when v1 is drawn from F∗
1 instead of F1.9 The latter
eﬀect occurs because the participation costs are higher under F∗
1 than under F1.I n t u i t i v e l y ,
when the active partner draws from a ﬁrst-order stochastically dominating distribution, his
expected signal is higher, and so is the value he engenders into the ﬁrm. As a result, the worst-
oﬀ type of silent partner becomes more content to free ride oﬀ the eﬀorts of the active partner,
making his participation in the dissolution mechanism more costly.
The change in the informational rents is independent of r, but the change in the participation
costs is inversely related to r.T h u s ,w h e nr approaches 1, the reduction in informational rents
predominates over the increase in participation costs, making the partnership easier to dissolve.
By contrast, for moderate values of r (i.e., when r<e r), the increase in participation costs
dominates and the partnership becomes more diﬃcult to dissolve when v1 is drawn from F∗
1
instead of F1.




which is clearly lower under F
∗
1 than under F1.
15Note also that, as the active partner’s expected signal increases, the gains from dissolving
the partnership fall, since it becomes less likely that a silent partner will be more eﬃcient than
the active partner in controlling the business. This rationale highlights a more general feature
of silent partnerships: they tend to be more diﬃcult to dissolve precisely when dissolution is less
desirable, from an eﬃciency perspective.
It is interesting to note that the increase in participation costs always predominates in the
benchmark case of equal-shares partnerships, as the corollary below shows.
Corollary 1 Consider distributions F∗
1 and F1 such that F∗
1 ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates
























cannot be dissolved eﬃciently either.
Proof. See Appendix.
We now analyze the intuitive counterpart to Proposition 5–i.e., the conditions where a
"worse" silent partner makes dissolvability more diﬃcult. We show that this will happen when-
ever r is not too large.
Proposition 6 Consider distributions F∗
2 and F2 such that F∗
2 ﬁrst-order stochastically domi-









(n − 2)F2(u)−1(1 − F2(u)) − 1
¤
du. (13)
r is greater than zero and may be greater than one. If partnership SP hn>2,r≤ r,F1,F 2i can
be dissolved eﬃciently, then partnership SP hn>2,r≤ r,F1,F∗
2i can be dissolved eﬃciently too.
Similarly, if partnership SP hn>2,r≤ r,F1,F∗
2i cannot be dissolved eﬃciently, then partner-
ship SP hn>2,r≤ r,F1,F 2i cannot be dissolved eﬃciently either.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 6 shows that "worse" silent partners tend to make it more diﬃcult to dissolve
a partnership whenever the share owned by the active partner is not too high (r ≤ r). When
the silent partners’ signals are drawn from F2 instead of F∗
2,w h e r eF∗
2 ﬁrst-order stochastically
dominates F2, there is no change in the individually rationality constraints. By contrast, the
incentive compatibility constraints of all partners are aﬀected. For the silent partners, incentive
compatibility becomes more costly to achieve, since the informational rents required to induce
truth-telling by the silent partners increase when their signals are drawn from F2 instead of F∗
2
16(this follows straightforwardly from footnote 9). This change is independent of r. For the active
partner, on the other hand, the change in incentive compatibility will generally depend on r.10
When r =0 ,t h ee ﬀect is unambiguous: informational rents increase for all partners, and
dissolution becomes more diﬃcult when the silent partners’ signals are drawn from a ﬁrst-order
stochastically dominated distribution function. The same applies when r is suﬃciently small
(r ≤ r), but not necessarily otherwise.
3.4 Examples
To further illuminate these results, we consider the class of examples where distributions display
the following forms:
F1(v1)=vα
1 for v1 ∈ [0,1],α>0
F2(vi)=v
β
i for vi ∈ [0,1],β>0 .
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The curved surface in Figure 1 plots the left-hand side minus the right-hand side of the above
expression, for r ∈ [0,1] and n = {2,3,...,100}.T h eﬂat plane is at zero for all r and n. Hence,
when the surface is above the plane, the inequality is satisﬁed.
When n =2 , inequality 15 is not satisﬁed for any distribution of shares. When n =3 ,a l l
partnerships with r ≤ 9
16 are dissolvable, while all partnerships with r> 9
16 are not. Note that,
in contrast to CGK, the range of dissolvable partnerships is not symmetric about the equal-
shares partnership. As such, there are ownership structures where partnerships are dissolvable
here but not dissolvable in the setting of CGK and vice-versa. Most notably, the inequality
above is always satisﬁed when n>2 and r =0 , so this "extreme ownership" partnership is




r]du + rv1. It can be easily shown that, when we replace F
∗
2 by F2, the change in this expression decreases with
r if and only if v1 ≥ v
∗
1.
17Figure 1: Eﬃcient Dissolution with Uniform Distributions
dissolvable unless n =2 .11 On the other hand, even though the upper bound of the range of
dissolvable partnerships increases with n,i ti sn o ts a t i s ﬁed for any n when r =1 .
Now, to illustrate Proposition 5 and Corollary 1, we ﬁx β =1and analyze changes in α.
Note that when α>(<)1, the active partner is expected to have a higher (lower) signal than
any silent partner. Focusing on the case of equal-shares partnerships (r = 1
n), the inequality
above is satisﬁed, when n =3if and only if α ≤ 1.8 (approximately). In this case, the higher is
α (the more capable is the active partner), the more diﬃcult the partnership is to dissolve.
To illustrate Proposition 6, we ﬁx α =1and analyze changes in β. Note that when β>(<)1,
all silent partners are expected to have a higher (lower) signal than the active partner. For the
equal-shares partnerships (r = 1
n), the inequality above is satisﬁed, when n =3 , if and only if
β ≥ .64 (approximately). In this case, the lower is β (the less capable are the silent partners),
t h em o r ed i ﬃcult the partnership is to dissolve.
In this class of examples, for most values of r, partnerships become easier to dissolve with
additional silent partners. This is true for both of the cases just discussed. When r = 1
3,α=1 .8
and β =1 , partnerships with n =4are easier to dissolve than partnerships with n =3 . The
same holds if α =1and β = .64.H o w e v e r ,f o rl a r g er, this is not necessarily true. For the latter




8,r 3 =0 } is dissolvable under CGK but





18case, if r = .95, a subsidy of approximately .124 is necessary to dissolve the partnership if n =3 ,
but .125 is needed if n =4 .
4C o n c l u s i o n
We have demonstrated another potential obstacle to eﬃcient dissolution of partnerships, namely
asymmetry of control of a ﬁrm’s operations. Our results suggest that partnerships in which one
partner dominates the active management of the ﬁrm will often encounter problems when they
attempt to dissolve. This problem is most acute if there is only one "silent" partner. On the
other hand, ﬁrms can mitigate this problem if they are willing, during the dissolution process,
to entertain bidding by outsiders. The intuition from this case is likely to extend to less extreme
control structures.
Numerous papers have addressed the determinants of real authority/control structure within
organizations. Other papers have studied the forces shaping the eﬃcient dissolution of partner-
ships. However, none of the contributions in each of these lines of research has analyzed the
eﬀects of the structure of control on the design of eﬃcient dissolution mechanisms. This paper
starts to ﬁll this gap. We provide a general framework for analysis and explore in detail a form of
partnership that is characterized by an extreme but common form of control structure. Our gen-
eral framework can nevertheless be applied to numerous other partnership structures. Further
applications will likely help us access in more detail how the allocation of control within orga-
nizations may aﬀect the prospects of eﬃcient dissolution. We look forward to further progress
in this area.
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Hence, any hs,ti that is incentive compatible and individually rational must satisfy equation 6.




























This guarantees that the mechanism is incentive compatible.
Individual rationality requires
Ti(v∗
i ) ≥ ri
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Pi(v∗
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P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1 . Eﬃciency requires the partner with the highest independent private
valuation to buy the ﬁrm. The probability that an individual partner’s vi is the highest is
Fi(vi)n−1. This imposes the following restriction on the share function: Si(vi)=Gi(vi)=
Fi(vi)n−1. The worst-oﬀ type v∗
i is deﬁned according to Lemma 2.








u{(n − 1)[1 − F2(u)]dG2(u) − F1(u)dG1(u) − (1 − r)dF1(u)} ≥ 0.














1 − r − (n − 1)F2(u)n−2 [1 − F2(u)]
ª












1 − r − (n − 1)F2(u)n−2 [1 − F2(u)]
ª
F1(u)du ≥ 0,
thus proving the lemma.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 . Since distribution F∗
1 ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates distri-
bution F1, F∗
1(u) ≤ F1(u) for all u. Note now that, in condition 9, only the second integral
depends on F1,w h e r eF1 enters multiplying the term in braces. The term in braces, in turn, is
p o s i t i v ei fa n do n l yi f
r ≤ 1 − (n − 1)F2(u)n−2 [1 − F2(u)] ≡ h(F2(u)).

















Hence, the second integral in condition 9 is always positive when r ≤ e r(n) and its value increases
with F1(u). This implies that, when r ≤ e r(n), the left-hand side of condition 9 is greater under F1
than under F∗
1. It follows that, if SP hn,r < e r(n),F∗
1,F 2i is dissolvable, SP hn,r < e r(n),F 1,F 2i
is dissolvable too. Similarly, if SP hn,r < e r(n),F 1,F 2i is not dissolvable, SP hn,r < e r(n),F∗
1,F 2i
is not dissolvable either.
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y1 . We need to show only that equal-shares partnerships ﬁt the condition
required in Proposition 5 about r. This is the case if 1












n−1 ≤ 1, it is easy to see that its left-hand side decreases
with n. Since the inequality is satisﬁed when n =3(3
4 ≤ 1), the proof is complete.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 . Since distribution F∗
2 ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates distribu-
tion F2, F∗
2(u) ≤ F2(u) for all u. Note now that, as F2(u) increases at the margin for all u,t h e












(n − 2)F2(u)−1(1 − F2(u)) − 1
¤
du,








(n − 2)F2(u)−1(1 − F2(u)) − 1
¤
du ≤ 0. (16)




(n − 2)F2(u)−1(1 − F2(u))F1(u)+1− F1(u)
¤
du ≥ 0,
so it clearly holds in that case. More generally, it is negative whenever r ≤ r.T o s e e t h i s , i t
suﬃces to note that G−1
1 (r) increases with r, so it follows from deﬁnition 13 that r ≤ r implies
inequality 9.
Thus, by continuity, LHS-9(r ≤ r,F∗
2) ≥ LHS-9(r ≤ r,F2). It follows that LHS-9(r ≤
r,F∗
2) ≤ 0 implies LHS-9(r ≤ r,F2) ≤ 0,s oi fp a r t n e r s h i pSP hn>2,r≤ r,F1,F∗
2i cannot
be dissolved eﬃciently, partnership SP hn>2,r≤ r,F1,F 2i cannot be dissolved eﬃciently ei-
ther. Similarly, LHS-9(r ≤ r,F2) ≥ 0 implies LHS-9(r ≤ r,F∗
2) ≥ 0, so if partnership
SP hn>2,r≤ r,F1,F 2i can be dissolved eﬃciently, partnership SP hn>2,r≤ r,F1,F∗
2i can
be dissolved eﬃciently too.
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